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I’m grateful to Aleta Quinn and Studies in History and Philosophy of Science for hosting this 
book forum. I’m also grateful to Margaret Greta Turnbull and Joseph Martin for their 
commentaries. In what follows, I address their comments as I understand them. 
Turnbull is concerned that I’m being unfair to antirealists. In Chapter 1, I use the example 
of COVID-19, and measures taken to curtail the spread of the novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2, 
such as social distancing, to illustrate the significance of the scientific realism/antirealism debate. 
If one is agnostic about the existence of unobservables like viruses, as antirealists are, then it’s 
difficult to see how one could be motivated to practice social distancing and follow other public 
policies designed to reduce the spread of SARS-CoV-2. Turnbull agrees that “it would seem a bit 
odd to engage in social distancing practices if one actively believed that there is nothing in the 
universe which remotely resembles anything like a pathogen.” However, Turnbull suggests that 
antirealists are not committed to agnosticism about pathogens because some bacteria are 
observable. As Turnbull puts it, “we can observe some bacteria directly through a simple (as 
opposed to, for example, an electron) microscope.” To me, Turnbull’s use of the term “direct” 
when talking about observation with the aid of instruments, such as microscopes, is confusing 
because antirealists are generally keen on distinguishing between direct observation and mere 
detection. The former can only be done without the aid of instruments. As van Fraassen (2001, p. 
154) puts it, “We can detect the presence of things and the occurrence of events by means of 
instruments. But in my book that does not generally count as observation. Observation is 
perception, and perception is something that is possible for us without instruments.” A 
microscope is an instrument, and so “observing” bacteria through a microscope doesn’t count as 
direct observation in the constructive empiricist’s book. Besides, viruses are too small to be 
“observed” (or detected) by means of optical microscopes. To “observe” (or detect) viruses like 
SARS-CoV-2, an electron microscope is needed. 
Turnbull goes on to suggest that antirealists could be motivated to practice social 
distancing without being committed to any theory about unobservable viruses. As Turnbull puts 
it, “To take COVID-19 social distancing practices seriously, it seems to me, you need merely 
hold some theory of disease remotely resembling ‘diseases are sometimes passed between 
individuals who are in physical proximity’.” The problem with such a vague theory of disease is 
that it must be silent on important questions of public health, such as how much distance to put 
between oneself and others, what kind of cloth to use for masks, whether to double-mask, and so 
on. Such questions get their answers directly from our understanding of the nature of viruses and 
how they spread. Consequently, the point that the COVID-19 example was meant to illustrate 
still stands: whether one believes or is agnostic about the relevant science (e.g., the science about 
SARS-CoV-2 and COVID-19) would have some effect on one’s decisions and any public 
policies one would be willing to endorse (e.g., social distancing). 
In that respect, it’s important to note that antirealists typically remain agnostic about, 
rather than deny the existence of, unobservables. Turnbull is concerned that my “language seems 
to imply that the antirealist actively denies that there exist unobservable entities that transfer 
disease between individuals.” They could do both. As van Fraassen (2001, p. 151) says, “if it is 
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unobservable then it is possible to be agnostic about its reality, even possible to say that it does 
not exist” (emphasis added). Both suspension of belief (agnosticism) and disbelief, however, 
would be rather poor motivators for action. For example, I have no belief or disbelief in aliens. 
For all I know, aliens may or may not exist, and I have no inclination either way. In that case, it 
would be very odd indeed if I were to behave as if aliens exist. Suppose that I were to take extra 
measures to always be with others, and never alone, so as not to get abducted by aliens. Such 
behavior would be very strange, given that I’m agnostic about the existence of aliens. Similarly, 
physically distancing oneself from others, wearing masks when around other people, and taking 
other measures to reduce the spread of SARS-CoV-2 and to protect oneself from COVID-19 
would be very strange behaviors for someone who is agnostic about viruses like SARS-CoV-2 
that cause infectious diseases like COVID-19. 
Finally, Turnbull suggests that antirealists can be realists about disease transference but 
agnostic about the nature of such transference. As Turnbull puts it, “the antirealist is not bound 
by her antirealism to hold the view that disease transference does not occur when individuals are 
in physical proximity. She need merely suspend judgment about the nature of that disease 
transference. Presumably it is observable to her that she has contracted an illness some days after 
observing a person in close physical proximity to her coughing.” First, if antirealists were to 
reason as Turnbull suggests, but without the theoretical background of virology, they would 
seem to be committing the post hoc fallacy. The mere occurrence of one event following another 
event doesn’t mean that the two events are causally connected, unless there is an understanding 
of the causal mechanisms at work. Of course, antirealists are agnostic about the causal 
mechanisms at work, namely, viruses, so such a causal inference is not available to them. 
More importantly, I don’t think that disease transference would count as observable in the 
antirealist’s book. Sickness, or rather some physical symptoms of sickness, such as vomiting and 
diarrhea, are observable. But the transfer of disease from one person to another would not count 
as directly observable in the antirealist’s book. And “if it is unobservable then it is possible to be 
agnostic about its reality, even possible to say that it does not exist” (van Fraassen 2001, p. 151). 
Consequently, I still think that the stakes are high when it comes to the scientific 
realism/antirealism debate. Suspension of belief (agnosticism) in the theoretical posits of science 
cannot seem to motivate people to act in accordance with the recommendations of science. In 
fact, it wouldn’t be unreasonable to suggest that many of the people who think that COVID-19 is 
a “hoax” are those who refuse to practice social distancing and wear masks in public. 
Unlike Turnbull, Martin approaches my book “as a historian,” “not as a philosopher.” He 
takes issue with what I say about the role of historical evidence in the scientific 
realism/antirealism debate. Martin provides an argument whose conclusion is that positions “in 
the realism/antirealism issue should account for known relevant historical evidence.” But that is 
precisely the problem. Both realist and antirealist positions account for the relevant historical 
evidence. Antirealists claim that some historical case study cannot be accommodated by 
scientific realism, and realists reply that it can be. For example, Laudan (1981, p. 33) argues that 
realism cannot accommodate the case of “the phlogiston theory of chemistry,” and Ladyman 
(2011, p. 87) argues that “the case of phlogiston theory is shown to be readily accommodated by 
ontic structural realism.” If competing theories accommodate or account for the same evidence, 
then that evidence is not decisive, i.e., it doesn’t favor one theory over the other. 
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Contrary to what Martin claims, then, I’m not suggesting that we should “disregard the 
[historical] data entirely!” Rather, my argument is that historical evidence is not decisive, i.e., it 
doesn’t favor realism over antirealism (and vice versa), because both realist and antirealist 
positions account for the historical evidence. If realism and antirealism are epistemically 
indistinguishable, given that they are equally well supported by the historical evidence, then 
there are no positive historical reasons to believe one over the other. This is a version of the 
familiar underdetermination of theory by evidence argument but applied to historical evidence as 
it is used in the scientific realism/antirealism debate. Indeed, it has been a feature of the debate 
that, looking at the historical record of science, realists see success, whereas antirealists see 
failure. If realists can select historical facts and case studies from the history of science that 
support a realist position about science, whereas antirealists can select historical facts and case 
studies from the history of science that support an antirealist position about science, then 
historical facts and case histories do not favor one position over the other. This doesn’t mean that 
historical evidence should be disregarded entirely. But it does mean that historical evidence is 
indeterminate between realist and antirealist positions about science. 
If arguments from historical evidence are not decisive, then we need different kinds of 
arguments to move the scientific realism/antirealism debate forward. That is precisely what the 
arguments for Relative Realism aim to accomplish. The arguments for Relative Realism are not 
inductive arguments from historical case studies. Nor are they inferences to the best explanation. 
Rather, they are deductive arguments from the comparative nature of theory evaluation and the 
relative nature of the predictive success of scientific theories. As such, they are arguments that 
proceed from premises that both realists and antirealists could accept, and thus move the debate 
forward. 
In his commentary, Martin says nothing about my other arguments concerning the use of 
historical evidence in the debate, specifically those about the kind of support case studies are 
supposed to give to philosophical theories about science. For case studies are “particular, 
detailed descriptions of scientific activity” (Currie 2015, p. 553), whereas realism and 
antirealism are general theories about the nature of science. So, “How much support [if any] does 
a single case study (or even a number of case studies) provide a general principle about the 
nature of science?” (Bishop and Trout 2002, S204). A particular, detailed description of 
scientific activity cannot provide valid deductive support for a general principle about the nature 
of science because a particular description doesn’t entail a general principle. And a particular, 
detailed description of scientific activity cannot provide strong inductive support for a general 
principle about the nature of science because to generalize from a particular description is to 
commit the fallacy of hasty generalization. So, even if historical case studies should play an 
evidential role in the debate, it’s not clear what kind of support they could provide to general 
theories about the nature of science, such as realism and antirealism. Reciting Lakatos’ (1970) 
dictum is not enough. Those who want to secure an evidential role for historical case studies in 
the debate need to demonstrate precisely what sort of evidential support a historical case study 
can give to general theories about the nature of science. 
Finally, Martin mentions that he has “some reservations about relative realism,” although 
he doesn’t articulate them. He also mentions in passing that “most realists would reject” the 
notion of comparative truth, but he doesn’t say why. However, as I argue in the book, with 
textual evidence, realists would probably accept the notion of comparative truth because they 
accept that theory evaluation in science is comparative. For example, according to Musgrave 
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(2017, p. 71), “As everybody also knows, science is empirical--scientists use observation and 
experiment to try to decide between the competing theories that they propose” (emphasis added). 
Now, comparative theory evaluation can only warrant comparative judgments about the 
competing theories that are being evaluated against each other. In other words, by its very nature, 
comparative theory evaluation allows us to say which theory among a set of competing theories 
is comparatively true, i.e., closer to the truth relative to its competitors, but it doesn’t allow us to 
say which theory is absolutely or likely true. 
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